Abstract:

Nudge regulations represented by government-enterprise co-governance, credit supervision, and compliance governance have been widely applied in China's platform antitrust field. By virtue of advantages such as flexible intervention, effective guidance, and dynamic adjustment, the application of Nudge Theory has effectively adapted to the differentiated, dynamic, and collaborative needs of platform economy supervision, achieving remarkable results in standardizing merchant operations, guiding consumer behavior, and allocating regulatory resources. However, the application of Nudge Theory, still in its infancy, faces practical challenges such as abuse of discretion, bottlenecks in sustained effectiveness, and instrumental omnipotence due to immature theoretical systems and incomplete application tools. Focusing on the normalized supervision and high-quality development of the platform economy, the optimization path for nudging-based platform antitrust regulation should aim to scientifically define the applicable limits of nudging to avoid excessive or insufficient supervision; promote the shaping of consensus values between enterprises and the government to ensure the synergy between antitrust objectives and market innovation; and integrate soft and hard regulatory measures, supplemented by data-driven tool optimization, to achieve precise and effective nudging regulation.

Key words: Nudge Theory, platform monopoly, legal regulation, nudge regulation